We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures, when the value of a coalition to a member depends solely on the identity of the other members of the coalition. We give a complete characterization of collections of coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure at every preference profile when only admissible coalitions may
take any form). Namely, coalition restrictions are restrictions on preferences in the form of ruling out the ranking of inadmissible coalitions high enough in the preference ordering that they can be chosen by some reasonable coalition formation rule. One convenient way of imposing this restriction, assuming that individual rationality is required by the coalition formation rule (i.e., no player is forced to join some coalition), is that inadmissible coalitions cannot be ranked above {i} for any player i in the coalition. Thus, if a coalition is ranked above {i} for any player i, then it can be ranked anywhere by all players in this coalition, since in this case it is an admissible coalition in the coalition restriction context. In sum, coalition restrictions can be viewed as a special form of preference restrictions (with a natural interpretation). Since restricting coalitions is a conceptually distinct approach (and, as the above cited related literatures testify, also a common approach), the results in this paper will be presented in terms of restrictions on coalitions. While the primary presentation is done in terms of restrictions on coalitions, the relationship of our results to results in the hedonic coalition formation literature will be explored.
Our study also differs from the previous studies on the hedonic coalition formation model in that its focus is the uniqueness rather than the existence of stable collections of coalitions.
The issue of a unique stable coalition structure has not been directly addressed previously; Banerjee et al. (2001) , however, present a condition on preference profiles, called the top coalition property, which is sufficient for the existence of a unique stable coalition structure.
We will discuss the relationship of the top coalition property to our results in the preference restrictions framework.
In this study our primary goal is to identify collections of coalitions that induce uniquely stable coalition structures. We provide a complete characterization of collections of admissible coalitions that guarantee the existence of a unique stable coalition structure with respect to these admissible coalitions for every preference profile. In particular, we show that a simple property of collections of coalitions, the single-lapping property, is necessary and sufficient for unique stability (Section 3). This property is easy to understand, and it has an intuitively clear graph representation (Section 4). Implications of our characterization results for matching problems, in particular, for the marriage and roommate problems, are also explored (Section 5). Furthermore, we show that the uniqueness of stable coalition structures is very closely linked to the existence of strategyproof coalition formation rules, and this relationship, which is examined in a more general framework by Sönmez (1999) , is also investigated (Section 6).
Definitions
There is a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and a set of preferences R i for each player i ∈ N . Player i's preferences R i ∈ R i strictly order all nonempty subsets S ⊆ N of N containing i. Preferences are strict, complete, and transitive. We will write SP i S to indicate strict preferences, and SR i S to indicate that either SP i S or S = S . We will refer to each nonempty subset of N as a coalition. We assume that players only care about the coalition they join. A coalition formation problem is defined by a pair (N, R), where R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) is a preference profile in R and R = × i∈N R i . Throughout this paper N is fixed, and thus a coalition formation problem is simply defined by a preference profile R ∈ R. We will use the notation top (R i ) to indicate the top-ranked coalition according to (R i ) : top (R i ) = S if S ⊆ N, i ∈ S, and for all T ⊆ N with i ∈ T, SR i T . Given R ∈ R and S ⊆ N, we denote (R i ) i∈S by R S . We also write R −i = R N −{i} and R −S = R N −S .
A coalition structure σ = {S 1 , . . . , S k }, with n ≥ k ≥ 1, is a partition of N , i.e., k t=1 S t = N , where all S t are pairwise disjoint. For all i ∈ N, σ i is the coalition in σ that contains i. Let Σ denote the set of all coalition structures. Furthermore, for all coalitions S ⊆ N , let [S] = {{i} : i ∈ S} denote the set of singletons for the members of S. Given a preference profile R ∈ R, a coalition S ⊆ N blocks σ ∈ Σ if for all i ∈ S, SP i σ i . A coalition structure σ is stable at R if there is no coalition that blocks σ, given R. Alternatively, we will say that a coalition formation problem (N, R) has a stable coalition structure σ ∈ Σ if σ is stable at R. Stable coalition structures can also be referred to as core coalition structures since the two notions are identical in this context. 2 Let Π = {S : S ⊆ N, S = ∅} denote the set of all coalitions in N . A collection of coalitions Π * ⊆ Π is a subset of Π such that [N ] ⊆ Π * . Thus, any collection of coalitions Π * contains all singletons. It is natural to restrict our attention to these collections of coalitions, since in most contexts individuals cannot be coerced to join any coalition. For Π * ⊆ Π and R i ∈ R i , let R i |Π * denote the restriction to Π * , i.e., for all i ∈ N, R i |Π * strictly orders the coalitions in Π * that contain i such that the ordering of these coalitions by R i is preserved. A coalition structure σ ∈ Σ is stable at R with respect to a collection of coalitions Π if σ ⊆ Π * and no coalition S ∈ Π * blocks σ, given R. Hence, a coalition structure that is stable with respect to some collection of coalitions is individually rational, since no singleton blocks it, which means that none of the players that are in a non-singleton coalition prefer to stay on their own. A collection of coalitions Π * induces a unique stable coalition structure if for all R ∈ R there exists a coalition structure σ ∈ Σ which is the unique stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * .
3 The Single-Lapping Property: A Characterization of Unique 
Condition (a) says that if there is an overlap between any two coalitions, there may be at most a single player who is a member of both coalitions, and hence any two coalitions may be at most single-lapping. Condition (b) is a cyclical single-lapping property: it requires that if a set of coalitions form a cycle in which any two neighbors have a common member, then all these coalitions have the same single member in common. Note that these two conditions can be combined by allowing m = 2 in Condition (b). First we specify an algorithm that leads to the stable coalition structure for each preference profile R ∈ R, given a collection of coalitions that satisfies the single-lapping property. Then we verify that the algorithm indeed always selects the unique stable coalition structure.
A Characterization of Unique Stability
An algorithm to select the unique stable coalition structure. 3 Let Π * be a collection of coalitions that satisfies the single-lapping property. Fix R ∈ R. We will identify the unique stable coalition structure σ * (R) ⊆ Π * .
First we show that there exists S ∈ Π * such that for all i ∈ S, top (R i |Π * ) = S.
Suppose, by contradiction, that such an S does not exist. Fix i ∈ N . Then [N ] ⊆ Π * implies that top (R i |Π * ) = {i}, and thus there exists j ∈ top (R i |Π * ) such that top Note that there may be several coalitions S such that for all i ∈ S, top (R i |Π * ) = S, and that all these coalitions are disjoint. Let
It is easy to verify that Π * 2 satisfies the single-lapping property. Hence, we can apply the above argument to find
Repeating this procedure iteratively we can identify a partition (M *
Now we show that σ * (R) is the unique stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * .
Step 1a: σ * (R) is the only conceivable stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * .
For all σ ⊆ Π * such that σ is a stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * , it must be the case that M * 1 ⊆ σ, since otherwise each coalition T ∈ M * 1 blocks σ. If m ≥ 2, this implies that for all σ ⊆ Π * such that σ is a stable coalition structure at R with respect to Step 1b: σ * (R) is a stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * .
Suppose there exists S ∈ Π * such that S blocks σ * (R). Then S T * 1 = ∅, since for all
since for all i ∈ T * 2 and for all Let Π * ⊆ Π be a collection of coalitions that induces a unique stable coalition structure.
Suppose it doesn't satisfy the single-lapping property.
Step 2a: Suppose Condition (a) is violated.
Then there exist S, T ∈ Π * such that S = T and |S T | ≥ 2. Let i, j ∈ S T such that i = j. Let R ∈ R satisfy the following.
i) For all l ∈ S − T , let R l rank S first and {l} second.
ii) For all l ∈ T − S, let R l rank T first and {l} second.
iii) Let R i rank S first, T second, and {i} third.
iv) For all l ∈ (S T ) such that l = i, let R l rank T first, S second, and {l} third. Note, in particular, that R j ranks T first, S second, and {l} third.
are stable at R with respect to Π * , and we have a contradiction, since the stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * is unique.
Step 2b: Suppose Condition (b) is violated. Let R ∈ R satisfy the following.
i) For all t = 1, . . . , k and for all l ∈ T t+1 such that l = i t , i t+1 , where we let i k+1 = i 1 , let R l rank T t+1 first and {l} second.
ii) For all t = 1, . . . , k, let R it rank T t+1 first, T t second, and {i t } third.
iii) Finally, for all
Let σ ∈ Σ be the unique stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * . Then there
Continuing this way we get a contradiction if k is odd, since in this case T k ∈ σ, which
In this case, however, a similar argument implies that there exists another stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * , σ , such that σ ⊇ {T 2 , T 4 , . . . , T k }. Thus, we have a contradiction, since the stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * is unique. 2
Restrictions on Preference Profiles versus Restrictions on Coalitions
We can extend the definition of the single-lapping property to a coalition formation problem in a natural way.
A coalition formation problem (N, R) (or, simply, a preference profile R) is singlelapping if the collection of coalitions
satisfies the single-lapping property. We will refer to the set of coalitions defined in (1) as the set of acceptable coalitions at R, and to any coalition in (1) as an acceptable coalition at R.
Theorem 1 has an immediate implication for the existence of a unique stable coalition structure for a coalition formation problem. Namely, that if a coalition formation problem is single-lapping then it has a unique stable coalition structure. This follows from Part 1 of Theorem 1. The converse statement does not hold, however; a coalition formation problem which has a unique stable coalition structure may contain acceptable coalitions that are low enough in the players' rankings and thus cause no trouble for the existence of a stable coalition structure, but which nonetheless imply that the set of acceptable coalitions does not satisfy the single-lapping property.
This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1 The unique stable coalition structure for this problem is σ = {{1, 2, 3}}, the joining of the grand coalition. The coalition formation problem R * is not single-lapping, however, since both 12 and 123 are acceptable coalitions, and Condition (a) is violated. 2
Next, we show that the top-coalition property proposed by Banerjee et al. (2001) is weaker than the single-lapping property when preferences are strict. In this paper, Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez show that the top-coalition property is sufficient for a unique stable coalition structure to exist. The single-lapping requirement (i.e., that the set of acceptable coalitions satisfies the single-lapping property) is more stringent.
Given a coalition S ⊆ N , a coalition T ⊆ S is a top-coalition of S if for any i ∈ T and any T ⊆ S with i ∈ T , T R i T . A coalition formation problem satisfies the top-coalition
property if for every coalition S ⊆ N there exists a top-coalition of S.
We can verify that the single-lapping property for coalition formation problems implies the top-coalition property, based on some of the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1. Fix R ∈ R and S ⊆ N . Assume that (N, R) is a single-lapping coalition formation problem.
Let Π * be the set of those acceptable coalitions at R which only contain members of S:
Note that since (N, R) is single-lapping, Π * satisfies the single-lapping property. Then we can show that there exists T ∈ Π * such that for all i ∈ T, top (R i |Π * ) = T, using a similar argument as in the algorithm in the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 1. This means that T is a top-coalition of S, which is what we needed to show.
The top-coalition property is weaker than the single-lapping requirement for coalition formation problems, which can be seen from Example 1. The coalition formation problem in Example 1 is not single-lapping. However, it satisfies the top-coalition property, given that coalition {1, 2, 3} is a top-coalition of itself, and any pair of players has a singleton as a top coalition in this problem. is a distinct path representing each non-singleton coalition in Π * . A graph associated with a collection of coalitions may not be unique, since it depends on which members of a coalition are connected by edges. We can ensure the uniqueness of the associated graph G for a collection of coalitions by following the convention that two players i, j ∈ S, where i < j, are connected by an edge in G to represent the coalition S ∈ Π * only if there is no l ∈ S such that i < l < j. In the following we will refer to this convention as the order convention.
We will say that a collection of coalitions has a tree structure representation if all of its associated graphs is a forest. 5 An example of a collection of coalitions satisfying the single-lapping property, together with its tree structure representation, is given below.
{9, 10, 11}, and
We shall illustrate that both Condition (a) and Condition (b) of the single-lapping property are satisfied by Π * , and thus the collection of coalitions in the example satisfies the single-lapping property. Note first that pairs of coalitions which have a non-empty intersection have the following members in common:
Since every other pair of coalitions has an empty intersection, and since every pair listed above has one member in common, we can conclude that Condition (a) holds. Furthermore, notice that the cyclical condition in (b) is only satisfied by the set of coalitions {S 4 , S 5 , S 6 }.
Then one can easily check that Condition (b) is satisfied, given that S 4 S 5 = S 5 S 6 = S 6 S 4 = {9}.
The tree structure representation of Π * which follows the order convention appears in Figure 1 . Notice that we cannot read off the admissible coalitions from the graph without specifying the partition of the edge set corresponding to the represented collection of coalitions (in Figure 1 , the doubly and triply bold edges indicate the appropriate partition). 2
An Alternative Characterization of Unique Stability
Theorem 2 (Tree structure representation) A collection of coalitions induces a unique stable coalition structure if and only if it has a tree structure representation.
We will prove the following lemma, which, together with Theorem 1, yields Theorem 2.
Lemma 1 A collection of coalitions satisfies the single-lapping property if and only if it
has a tree structure representation. 
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C. Recall that E can be partitioned into {E 1 , . . . , E m } such that for each z = 1, . . . , m, E z is a path which represents S z ∈ Π * . Then C ⊆ E can be partitioned into {C 1 , . . . , C k } such that for all t = 1, . . . , k, there exists z t ∈ {1, . . . , m} with C t ⊆ E z t . Note that k ≥ 2, since a path that constitutes a cycle cannot represent a single coalition. Suppose k = 2.
Then there exist i, j ∈ N, i = j, such that C connects i and j and {i, j} ⊆ S z 1 S z 2 . This contradicts Condition (a) in the definition of the single-lapping property. Hence, k ≥ 3. Fix a collection of coalitions Π * ⊆ Π that has a tree structure representation. Let G = (N, E) be a graph associated with Π * . Then G is a forest. Suppose Π * does not satisfy the single-lapping property. Assume first that Condition (a) does not hold. Then there exist S, T ∈ Π * such that S = T and |S T | ≥ 2. This implies that there exist two paths E S ⊂ E and E T ⊂ E such that E S E T = ∅, E S represents S, and E T represents T . Then, since |S T | ≥ 2, G contains a cycle, which is a contradiction. Thus, Condition (a) holds, and hence Condition (b) must be violated. We can show similarly for this case that G contains a cycle, which again contradicts the fact that it is a forest. Therefore, Π * satisfies the single-lapping property. 2
Some Implications of the Tree Structure Representation
A special class of coalition formation problems is called consecutive, a property that is defined by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2000) as an analogue, for simple coalition formation games, of the property given by Greenberg and Weber (1986) . A coalition formation problem is consecutive if there exists an ordering of the players such that every acceptable coalition is made up of players who are indexed consecutively with respect to this ordering. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2000) prove in the preference restriction context that this property is sufficient for the existence of a stable coalition structure.
Noting that the acceptable coalitions in a consecutive coalition foramtion problem are represented by arbitrary paths in a linear graph, it is easy to compare consecutive and singlelapping coalition formation problems. Single-lapping coalition formation problems are both more and less restrictive than consecutive coalition formation problems. On the one hand, in single-lapping coalition formation problems acceptable coalitions are represented by paths in a tree rather than in a linear graph, which is more general. On the other hand, singlelapping coalition formation problems are more restrictive in that not all coalitions may be acceptable which are represented by a path (whether in a tree or a linear graph), since two coalitions that have more than one member in common cannot be acceptable.
The single-lapping property, or, equivalently, the existence of a tree structure representation, is extremely restrictive. Since such restrictions on admissible coalitions do not occur naturally in most contexts, it follows from our results that if we have no a priori information about the preferences then unique stability cannot be guaranteed in purely hedonic coalition formation processes in most social, economic, and political settings. A normative conclusion that one may draw from our theorems is that if the coalition formation process can be affected or designed by some organization, it may be desirable to select a collection of coalitions that meets these strict criteria, in order to ensure the existence of a unique stable coalition structure. The need for such a design may be particularly pronounced if the preferences of the players are private information, and is further underlined by the implications of unique stability for strategyproofness that we examine in Section 6. Ideally, the choice should depend on some public information relevant to the formation of coalitions, and it may take into account the preferences of the designer. The question in general is one of choosing a a spanning tree 6 of G = (N, E c ), which will afford the greatest flexibility possible under the circumstances (where E c denotes the complete graph, a graph in which any two players are connected by exactly one edge).
One way of constructing a spanning tree, based on a priori knowledge of the desirability of placing pairs of players in the same coalition, is given by the following procedure. Order the pairs of players according to how desirable it is to have them in the same coalition (e.g., put pairs of "friends" first and pairs of "enemies" last, or place pairs that are well-matched according to their skills, views, etc., on the top, depending on the context). Starting from the top, let an edge connect the two players in the first pair, in the second pair, and so on, until the addition of the edge corresponding to a pair would create a cycle. Skip this pair, and continue in a similar manner down the list of pairs, until the addition of any edge would yield a cycle. Clearly, we have arrived at a spanning tree. Now partition the edge set into sets of consecutive edges so that the resulting admissible coalitions are desirable according to some criteria (e.g., optimal size of coalitions). In this way we have constructed a collection of coalitions that satisfies the single-lapping property. We give a specific example of this construction below.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and let the following list of pairs of players indicate the order of these pairs from well-matched to not well-matched, relative to each other, according to some known criteria: (1, 6), (2, 5), (1, 2), (2, 4), (5, 6), (4, 5), (3, 4), (2, 3), (2, 6), (3, 6), (1, 4), (4, 6), (1, 3), (1, 5), (3, 5). Thus (1, 6) is the most well-matched pair, and (3, 5) is the least well-matched pair.
is called a spanning tree of G. More generally, when G may not be connected, we can find similarly a spanning forest of G.
Based on these ordered pairs, we can construct the spanning tree in Figure 2a as follows.
First we connect by an edge 1 and 6. Then we connect 2 and 5. Then we connect 1 and 2, but only if this does not introduce a cycle in the graph. Since this holds, we connect 1 and 2. Similarly, since an edge connecting 2 and 4 does not introduce a cycle in the graph we just created, we add an edge between 2 and 4. Next, note that an edge between 5 and 6 would result in the cycle 1 − 2 − 5 − 6 − 1. Thus, we skip the pair (5, 6). We also skip (4, 5) since an edge between 4 and 5 would result in the cycle 2 − 4 − 5 − 2. We connect 3 and 4 next, which does not introduce a cycle in the graph. Now note that any additional edge would create a cycle, which means that we stop here, and that the resulting graph is a spanning tree. Now that we have constructed a spanning tree, we need to partition its edge set into coalitions. While this always leads to a collection of coalitions that satisfies the singlelapping property, note that this requires some more a priori information or criteria for forming coalitions. Suppose it is desirable to partition the edge set so that
. Figure 2b shows the unique representation of Π * that follows the order convention. Note that this representation is also a tree structure representation of Π * , just like the spanning tree in Figure 2b .
Finally, we take a specific preference profile R ∈ R n to illustrate how to use the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 1 in order to identify the unique stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * . Let R be the following (where we only indicate the coalitions in Π This procedure illustrates how one may restrict a priori the coalition formation procedure in order to guarantee unique stability for all preference profiles. Admittedly, if restrictions don't arise naturally, or are insufficient in numbers, the construction of a spanning tree essentially determines a priori the coalitions to be formed, without much reference to the preferences. On the other hand, imposing restrictions may be quite natural in some contexts, for example, in the cases of marriage and roommate markets, which we explore next. 
Implications for Matching Problems
Two special cases of simple coalition formation problems are the well-studied problems of matching in marriage and roommate markets. For these problems any collection of admissible coalitions Π * ⊆ Π is such that for all S ∈ Π * , |S| ≤ 2, that is, any non-singleton admissible coalition is of size two. In the case of the marriage problem it is also required that for all S ∈ Π * with S = {i, j}, i = j, we have i ∈ W and j ∈ M , where N = W M and W and M are the disjoint sets of women and men. The existence of a stable marriage matching (i.e., a stable coalition structure) for every preference profile is shown by Gale and Shapley (1962) in their classical paper (for an alternative non-constructive proof see Sotomayor (1996) ), and they also show in the same paper that there may not exist any stable roommate matching. It is also well-known that stable marriage matchings are typically not unique.
Alcalde (1995) gives a sufficient condition for the existence of stable roommate matchings. His sufficiency property, α-reducibility, is the two-person equivalent of the topcoalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) , and is therefore implied by the single-lapping property for roommate problems. A complete characterization of preference profiles for which a stable roommate matching exists is provided by Tan (1991) , and a stronger sufficiency condition, which allows for indifferences, the no-odd-rings condition, is identified by Chung (2000) , both of which are implied by the single-lapping property.
Our characterization results, Theorems 1 and 2, shed some light on these matching problems as well, by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for collections of coalitions to induce a unique stable marriage matching as well as a unique stable roommate matching.
Our results also apply to the more complex problem of multi-sided matching (whereas the marriage problem is a two-sided matching problem), for which the admissible coalitions are singletons and coalitions of size k (k ≥ 3), and every coalition of size k has one player from each of the k sides of the market (see Alkan (1988) for a non-existence result for threesided matching markets). Theorems 1 and 2 do not apply, however, to two-sided matching problems in which players on one or both sides of the market may be matched to more than one player on the other side of the market, 7 because it is usually assumed that the players do not care about who else is matched to the same player as they are. 8
In the case of roommate problems (and marriage problems as a special case), unique stability may be understood best by considering the tree structure characterization given in Theorem 2. In this special case there is a unique graph associated with any collection of coalitions (i.e., sets of acceptable pairs), regardless of any convention, since in this case there is an edge between two players if and only if they constitute an acceptable pair.
Note also that the graph associated with a roommate problem unambiguously indicates the admissible coalitions. The only difference between the associated graphs of marriage and roommate problems is that for roommate problems there may be an edge between any two players, whereas for marriage problems the graph is a priori restricted to be bipartite 9 with respect to the partition of women and men, and thus an edge is ruled out a priori between players of the same sex.
Given that there is an edge between two players in a graph representation of collections of coalitions for marriage and roommate problems if and only if this pair of players 7 The best-known of these problems is the college admissions problem, or many-to-one matching problem (for an introduction, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) ). Even more complex is the many-to-many matching problem (see, for example, Alkan (1999) , Sotomayor (1999), and Martínez et al. (2000) ).
8 Some work has been done to understand many-to-one stable matchings when players care about who else is matched to the same player on the other side of the market (see Dutta and Massó (1997) ). Our results apply in this framework. 9 A graph is bipartite if the set of players can be split into two disjoint sets such that each edge connects a player from one set with a player in the other set. Note that if G is a bipartite graph then each cycle of G is even (i.e., consists of an even number of edges).
is acceptable, in the following we will call a graph associated with a collection of coalitions (collection of acceptable pairs) for these two special problems the associated acceptability graph. It follows from Lemma 1 that a collection of coalitions satisfies the single-lapping property in a marriage or roommate market if and only if its associated acceptability graph has no cycles. Therefore, the following corollary is implied by Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 In marriage and roommate problems a collection of acceptable pairs induces a unique stable matching if and only if the associated acceptability graph contains no cycles.
It is easily seen that Theorem 1 leads to the same implication. Since the requirement that two distinct coalitions cannot have more than one member in common is trivially satisfied in these simpler cases, the definition of the single-lapping property reduces to Condition (b).
Condition (b), in turn, is immediately seen to be equivalent to the requirement that there are no cycles in the associated acceptability graph. Let us also remark that for marriage and roommate problems unique stability is consistent with every consecutive coalition being admissible (whether consecutiveness is meant on a line or on a tree), unlike for general coalition formation problems, since Condition (a) holds vacuously in these cases. Thus, for these matching problems the single-lapping property may be regarded as a consecutiveness property on a tree.
A result that is related to Corollary 1, but deals with the existence rather than the uniqueness of stable coalition structures, is due to Abeledo and Isaak (1991) . They show that, in our terminology, a collection of acceptable pairs induces some stable matching, which is not necessarily unique, if and only if the associated acceptability graph is bipartite.
This is a finding that explains the gap between the existence result for marriage problems and the non-existence result for roommate problems, namely, that marriage problems rule out odd cycles (cycles that consist of an odd number of edges). Our condition is more demanding, since it rules out every cycle, not only odd cycles.
We conclude this section by giving some examples of acceptability graphs without cycles that may arise naturally or may be constructed easily, based on a priori information. For example, if it is publicly known that some mates are not acceptable to some players (the most obvious example of this is players of the same sex for each player in marriage markets), then it is natural to restrict E accordingly, and then remove further edges from the graph, if necessary, in order to arrive at a spanning forest.
Our first example is for marriage markets. Suppose it is desirable to match men and women closely according to a one-dimensional criterion such as height. Suppose, furthermore, that it is required that a woman should never be taller than her mate. Then, assuming that there are no two women or two men who are exactly of the same height, one may use the following acceptability graph that has no cycles. A pair of a woman and a man is an acceptable pair (i.e., there is an edge connecting them in the acceptability graph), whenever the woman is not taller than the man, and there is no other man who is shorter than the man in question, but not shorter than the woman.
The acceptability graph consists of stars (one player is connected to all the other players), as connected components, for roommate problems, if the players are a priori partitioned into small groups of "friends" (or "acquaintances"), so that it would be undesirable to match players from different groups, and if each group of friends that consists of more than two players has a "center," a person who is the only acceptable roommate to all the others in her group of friends. Finally, the acceptability graph for roommate problems is a linear graph there is a collection of coalitions that satisfies the single-lapping property, and if it is known a priori that players prefer staying on their own to joining any of the coalitions not in this collection, then not only the existence of a unique stable coalition structure is guaranteed for every preference profile, but also the coalition formation rule that chooses the unique stable coalition structure at each profile possesses desirable properties, namely, stragyproofness, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality. This is the first part of the next theorem.
Furthermore, Sönmez (1999) proved for a general indivisible goods allocation model, which includes our model as a special case, that if there is a strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational allocation rule, whenever the core is nonempty, the allocation rule must select an allocation in the core, and the core must be a singleton when preferences are strict. 11 Therefore, the coalition formation rule that chooses the unique stable coalition structure at each preference profile is the only rule that has these three desirable properties.
While uniqueness, the second part of the next theorem, follows from Sönmez (1999), we provide an alternative direct proof of uniqueness for our model. profile R ∈ R Π * a coalition structure σ ∈ Σ. We use the notation f i (R) = σ i , where
all R ∈ R Π * , there does not exist σ ∈ Σ such that for all i ∈ N, σ i R i f i (R), and for some j ∈ N, σ j P j f j (R). A coalition formation rule f is individually rational if for all R ∈ R Π * and for all i ∈ N, f i (R)R i {i}. Ledyard (1977) , which studies strategyproof rules that select a core allocation, and finds that the existence of a best unblocked allocation for all the participants is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a strategyproof rule in core selecting organizations.
coalition structure with respect to Π * at every preference profile.
Proof: Fix a collection of coalitions Π * ⊆ Π that satisfies the single-lapping property.
Part 1: Existence. Let f : R Π * → Σ be the coalition formation rule that selects the unique stable coalition structure with respect to Π * at every preference profile. We will show that f is strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational.
First, suppose that f is not individually rational. Then there exist i ∈ N and R ∈ R Π * such that {i}P i f i (R). This means that {i} blocks f (R), given R, and f (R) is not stable at R with respect to Π * , given that {i} ∈ Π * . Hence, f is individually rational.
Next, suppose f is not Pareto efficient. Then there exist R ∈ R Π * and σ ∈ Σ such that for all i ∈ N, σ i R i f i (R), and for some j ∈ N, σ j P j f j (R). Let S = σ j . Then for all i ∈ S, S = f i (R) and thus σ i = S implies that SP i f i (R). This means that S blocks f (R). Furthermore, for all i ∈ S, SP i f i (R)R i {i}, by individual rationality. This implies that S ∈ Π * , which contradicts the fact that σ is stable at R with respect to Π * . Hence, f is Pareto efficient.
It remains to show that f is strategyproof. First note that for all R ∈ R Π * , f (R) ⊆ Π * , by individual rationality, and thus for all i ∈ N and R ∈ R Π * , f i (R) ∈ Π * . Suppose
Since both f j (R) and f i (R i , R −i ) are in Π * , and since Π * satisfies the single-lapping property, i, j ∈ f i (R i , R −i ) and j ∈ f j (R) imply that i ∈ f j (R), otherwise Condition (a) would be violated. Hence f j (R) = f i (R). Then, since f j (R) does not block
Since both f l (R i , R −i ) and f j (R) are in Π * , and since Π * satisfies the single-lapping Condition (b) implies in this case that h = i. Continuing similarly, we reach a contradiction, given that the set of players is finite.
Therefore, f is strategyproof.
Part 2: Uniqueness. Let f : R Π * → Σ be a coalition formation rule that satisfies strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality. We will show that f selects the unique stable coalition structure with respect to Π * at every preference profile. Fix R ∈ R Π * . Let σ * ∈ Σ denote the unique stable coalition structure at R with respect to Π * .
We will prove that f (R) = σ * .
SpecifyR ∈ R Π * as follows. For all i ∈ N , letR i rank σ * i first, and, provided σ * i = {i}, Most results on strategyproof coalition formation and matching rules are negative. 12 Sönmez (1999) shows that there is no strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rule when all conceivable coalitions are admissible and preferences over coalitions are unrestricted. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2000) prove that strategyproofness and individual stability (a weaker notion than stability) are incompatible on a rather restricted domain of preferences, namely, where only the size of a coalition matters, but not the identity of its members, and preferences over the size are single-peaked.
A possibility result reported previously is the finding by Alcalde and Barberà (1994) that if preferences satisfy a so-called top dominance condition for one side of a marriage market, then it is sufficient, and, under a richness condition on the preference domain, also necessary that there exists a stable and strategyproof matching rule. 13 In a recent paper Alcalde and Revilla (2000) identify a strategyproof coalition formation rule, which is characterized by stability and strategyproofness, under the assumption that agents' preferences satisfy a socalled top responsiveness condition. This restriction on preferences ensures that the core is non-empty, but it may not necessarily be a singleton. 14 12 There is a parallel result with Theorem 3 for Shapley-Scarf indivisible goods markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) , which is proved by Roth (1982) and Ma (1994) . 13 See also Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a discussion of the incentives in matching problems and further references. 14 The top responsiveness condition does not satisfy the preference domain conditions used in Sönmez (1999) , so that the singleton core condition of the latter does not apply to the results of Alcalde and Revilla (2000) .
In this study we provide a complete characterization of collections of admissible coalitions that guarantee the existence of a unique stable coalition structure regardless of preferences.
Our characterization result is based on a simple and intuitive property of collections of coalitions, the single-lapping property, which is very easy to check. An alternative characterization based on a graph-theoretical equivalent of the single-lapping property is provided for additional insights, and the implications for simpler matching problems as well as for the existence of strategyproof coalition formation rules are also explored. A further question to investigate is whether a similar intuitive characterization of existence, but not necessarily uniqueness, of stable coalition structures, can be given.
